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The Case for the Digital Platform Act defines "digital platform" as a service that:

1. Is accessed via the internet;
2. Is at the center of a two-sided or multi-sided market where at least one side is open to the general public and allows the public to play multiple roles;
3. Enjoys specific types of powerful network effects.

The Case for the Digital Platform Act proposes an agency specifically charged to regulate digital platforms on an ongoing basis. An expert agency over digital platforms can analyze and study the market to determine when regulation or enforcements are needed, including if:

• Dominant digital platforms should be required to offer interconnection to competitors through open APIs to break down network effects that lock in users.
• Dominant digital platforms should be prohibited from self-preferencing and some types of discrimination. An agency can monitor and enforce this through “black-box testing,” protecting details of proprietary algorithms.
• There should be restrictions on acquisitions by dominant digital platforms, including non-horizontal acquisitions usually less scrutinized by antitrust agencies.
• Certain platforms that collect data from competitors (or potential competitors defined broadly) should be limited in how they can use their competitor’s data.

Because digital platforms often challenge traditional concepts of antitrust markets and traditional metrics of market power, The Case for the Digital Platform Act proposes a new metric, the “cost of exclusion” (CoE). Recognizing that the power of digital platforms derives from the powerful network effects possible with flexible, multi-sided markets, CoE measures the cost to an individual or business based on exclusion from the platform. This measure is designed to be flexible enough to apply both to the economic cost of exclusion and to the cost to individuals from being excluded from platforms increasingly central to civic discourse and the public sphere.